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This paper analyses a model of competition where the firms set not only prices but also the
complexity levels of their prices (which determine how diffi cult it is for consumers to assess the
price offers). Unlike previous work, in this model, the firms’confusion technology may be non-
linear in the aggregate complexity level. The equilibrium probability of using high complexity
increases in the number of firms but decreases in the convexity of the confusion technology.
In large markets, the firms use high complexity almost surely. However, the industry profit
converges to the highest level with concave technologies and to the lowest level with convex
technologies. An increase in consumer sophistication, which benefits the consumers, may not
reduce market complexity.
Keywords: price complexity, confusion technology, concavity/convexity, oligopoly markets
JEL classification: D03, D43, L13
∗I thank the Editor, Julian Wright, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments, which significantly
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In many markets, including banking, finance, and energy retail, firms’use of partitioned prices,
differentiated price formats, or technical language in their price disclosures makes it harder for
consumers to assess prices and identify the best offer. Recent research associates price complexity
with consumer inertia and lack of sophistication, price and format dispersion, positive mark-ups,
and unintended responses to intensified competition. It also raises concerns about its strategic use
by firms to create consumer confusion and soften competition.
Discussing the challenges of consumer financial regulation, Campbell (2016) points out that
"financial ignorance is pervasive and unsurprising given the complexity of modern financial prod-
ucts". The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail banking market
found that price complexity may prevent consumers from receiving good value and identifying the
best deals. A 2007 EC study of EU mortgage credit markets and the 2011 report by the UK
Independent Commission on Banking echo these concerns.1
Related theoretical work sends a consistent message that, in homogeneous product markets, the
positive effects of stronger competition are weakened by increases in complexity and equilibrium
obfuscation, and identifies the possibility that an increase in the number of firms harms consumer
welfare; see Spiegler (2016) for a synthesis. Although existing results raise concerns about the per-
formance of markets with price complexity and the impact of competition, they provide relatively
limited guidance for competition and consumer protection policy.
This paper aims to inform policy and explores some key questions. Is the degree of complexity
a good indicator of market performance? Does an increase in consumer sophistication increase
market transparency? Under what conditions does an increase in the number of firms harm
consumer welfare? What tests can be used to assess the impact of competition on welfare? Robust
answers to these questions are crucial to the practical relevance of extant findings.
The analysis focuses on homogeneous product oligopoly markets where firms compete in price
and price complexity. Like in Carlin (2009), complexity makes it harder to assess prices and
prevents some consumers from identifying the best deal. Given firms’complexity choices some
consumers are ‘informed’or ‘experts’, while others are ‘confused’. Like in Varian (1980), the ex-
perts are able to assess all prices and buy the lowest-price product, while the confused consumers
buy from a randomly selected firm (or make random mistakes). The shares of experts and con-
fused consumers depend on firms’price complexity choices. A unilateral increase in a firm’s price
complexity increases the share of confused consumers as it raises the diffi culty of assessing prices.
Our model generalizes the Varian-Carlin framework to accommodate confusion technologies
which may be concave or convex in the aggregate complexity level. In contrast, in Carlin (2009)
1For instance, Woodward and Hall (2012) show that, in US mortgage markets, deals with the arrangement fee
rolled into the interest rate are better than those that quote these fees separately. For a recent discussion of related
empirical work, see Campbell (2016).
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the confusion technology is linear, while in Varian (1980) the share of confused consumers is
exogenous. In the proposed model, the increase in the share of confused consumers triggered by
an increase in a firm’s complexity may be either reduced or magnified by the complexity of the
rivals’price offers.2
As a result, this analysis considers a wider gamut of consumer behaviors. For instance, con-
sider a firm which increases its price complexity by including more technical terms or sophisticated
jargon. If there is consumer learning by doing, the effect of the increase in complexity would be
smaller if rivals’aggregate complexity were higher. Consumers may get better at deciphering tech-
nical language the more they are exposed to it, and so there would be some reciprocal cancellation
of firms’complexity levels. On the other hand, if consumers are more likely to be demoralized
or make mistakes as the informational load increases, the effect of an incremental increase in
complexity may be larger when rivals’aggregate complexity is higher.
Consistent with closely related analyses, in our model price complexity underlies consumer
heterogeneity and in symmetric equilibrium the firms randomize on prices from a closed interval
according to a continuous distribution function.3 When setting a relatively low price, a firm benefits
from low complexity, but when setting a relatively high price, it benefits from high complexity. As
a result, in equilibrium there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity levels, and
dispersion in both prices and complexity levels. Despite product homogeneity, prices are strictly
above marginal cost and expected profits are strictly positive.
Our extended framework distinguishes between two properties of the confusion technology,
the convexity/concavity (the curvature) and the degree of consumer sophistication, and cleanly
separates their comparative statics effects. To isolate these properties, our oligopoly model para-
metrizes the curvature of the confusion technology. However, in the preliminary duopoly analysis,
this distinction does not depend on the parametrization of the curvature.
In the symmetric duopoly equilibrium, an increase in the convexity of the confusion technology
(or a reduction in its concavity) increases the probability of using low complexity, decreases the
lowest price associated with low complexity, weakly increases the lowest price associated with
high complexity, decreases the average price and expected industry profit, and increases expected
consumer surplus. For a given probability of using low complexity, the expected share of confused
consumers decreases in the convexity of the confusion technology. Greater convexity delivers a
greater expected market share increment to a firm reducing complexity and competing aggressively.
So, as the confusion technology becomes more convex or less concave, the firms rely less on confused
consumers and the equilibrium probability of using low complexity increases.
2One interpretation is that an increase in complexity raises the cost of gathering market-wide information and
dissuades more consumers from assessing offers. Then, convexity or concavity in confusion can be related to the
convexity or concavity of the cost of gathering market-wide price information. We formalize this interpretation in
the online appendix.
3These results can be related to the broader literature on price dispersion; see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006)
for a survey.
3
Our duopoly analysis shows that an increase in consumer sophistication decreases the average
price and expected firm’s and industry’s profits, but has no impact on the frequency of using low
complexity. This indicates that although consumer protection programmes which raise consumer
awareness (e.g., financial literacy programmes) boost consumer surplus, they may not reduce
overall market complexity. So, market transparency may not be a good indicator of the effectiveness
of consumer awareness initiatives or, more generally, of market performance.
The oligopoly analysis generalizes some of these results and explores the impact of changes in
the number of firms and their policy implications. An increase in the number of firms increases a
firm’s probability of using high complexity and so lowers market transparency. In relatively small
markets, expected industry profit is not monotonic in the number of firms. In large markets with
concave or linear confusion technology, the expected share of confused consumers and industry
profit are bounded away from zero and converge to the highest possible level as the number of
firms goes to infinity. In contrast, in large markets with convex confusion technology, the expected
number of confused consumers and industry profit converge to zero. Hence, competition policy
which increases the number of firms may backfire in relatively small markets and be undesirable
in large markets with concave or linear confusion technology.
As concave confusion technologies are consistent with consumer learning by doing, our results
suggest that the latter may coexist with poor outcomes for consumers in large markets. However,
large markets with convex confusion technologies may perform well. More generally, in markets
with many competitors, although firms use high complexity almost surely, the impact of complexity
on consumer surplus and an effective policy approach depend crucially on the characteristics of
the confusion technology.
Our analysis is closely related to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), and
especially, to Carlin (2009). Piccione and Spiegler (2012) explore a general comparability structure
in a duopoly market and identify a necessary and suffi cient condition for firms to earn max-min
profits in equilibrium. In their model, consumers are initially attached to one firm and can only
compare offers whose price formats are compatible. In the oligopoly analysis in Chioveanu and
Zhou (2013), where firms can choose one of two price formats, an increase in the number of firms
induces them to rely more on complexity and may harm consumer welfare. These studies focus on
price comparability and how it is affected by price presentation. Closer to Carlin (2009), in our
analysis, the share of consumers who gather price information depends on the overall complexity
of the market.4
Our work complements these analyses by examining the impact of confusion technology’s cur-
vature on market outcomes and highlighting its policy implications. The only other analysis of
concavity/convexity in confusion technology we are aware of is de Roos (2018), which studies the
4These papers focus on symmetric market settings. Gu and Wenzel (2014), Chioveanu (2018), and Chioveanu
(2019) consider asymmetric duopoly models to study the interplay between price complexity/framing and firm
prominence.
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impact of limited product comparability on the viability of collusion. His work differs substantially
both in focus and in modelling terms: it defines convexity in relation to format similarity rather
than overall complexity, it considers repeated interaction, and it explores confusion due to limited
comparability.
The next section introduces the model and a taxonomy of confusion technologies. Section 3
presents preliminary results, while section 4 provides a duopoly analysis. Section 5 characterizes the
unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the general oligopoly model. Section 6 presents
comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses consumer protection and competition
policy implications. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with n ≥ 2 identical firms. Marginal costs of
production are constant and normalized to zero. There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding
at most one unit of the product and willing to pay at most v = 1.5 The firms simultaneously and
noncooperatively choose prices, pi for i ∈ N = {1, 2, ...n}, and the complexity of their prices. There
are two possible complexity levels and each firm can choose just one of them, ki ∈ {k, k̄}, where
k̄ > k. The profile of firms’price complexity choices is k, an n-vector whose i-th component is ki.
Complexity is related to the way in which firms convey price information and can be adjusted as
easily as prices, which is reflected by the timing.6
In our model, complexity increases the diffi culty of assessing firms’price offers and is a source
of consumer confusion. Based on firms’ complexity choices, there are two types of consumers,
experts (or informed) and confused (or uninformed). The experts purchase the cheapest product
that provides positive surplus, while the confused consumers buy at random, so that they choose
a particular firm with probability 1/n.
The firms’price complexity levels determine the share of confused consumers in the market,
which is assumed to be a symmetric function. Due to symmetry, for a given k, the shares of experts
and confused consumers are solely determined by n−m, the count of k̄ in k (or alternatively, by
m, the count of k in k) where m ∈ {0, 1, ...n}. Hence, the share of confused consumers can be
written as a function,
γ : N→ [0, 1] .
Specifically, when n−m firms use k̄, the share of confused consumers is γ(n−m). For simplicity,
let γ(0) = 0.7 Denote γ(n) ≡ γmax. The analysis focuses on markets where there are always some
5The marginal costs and reservation values are normalized for expositional ease and without loss of generality.
6Price complexity in this setting is a form of ‘price framing’. Alternatively, firms may engage in ‘product framing’
- a form of spurious product differentiation (e.g., involving decisions on product size or packaging), which cannot be
adjusted as frequently as prices and is better captured by a sequential move framework. See the related discussion
in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013).
7 In a market where γ(0) ∈ (0, 1), possibly due to the intrinsic characteristics of the product, firms cannot
completely eliminate price complexity. So, even when all firms use the simplest price format available, some consumers
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expert consumers (i.e., γmax < 1) due to their real-world relevance. However, for completeness it
also covers the case where all consumers are confused if all firms use k̄ (i.e., γmax = 1).
By making it more diffi cult to assess firms’offers, an increase in one firm’s price complexity
increases the fraction of confused consumers in the market, so that
γ(n−m) < γ(n−m+ 1) . (1)
To capture the impact of a rival’s price complexity on the diffi culty of evaluating a firm’s offer, let
γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1) = γ(n−m+ 1)− γ(n−m)
β
, (2)
for all m and β > 0. This formulation parametrizes the rate of change of the incremental share
of confused consumers, which is summarized by β, and provides a tractable way to explore more
general confusion technologies. If β > 1 (β < 1), a unilateral incremental increase in complexity
is more (less) effective when the rivals’complexity is higher (lower), i.e. firms’complexity levels
reinforce (offset) each other in creating confusion. Specifically, depending on the value of β > 0,
(2) provides a taxonomy of confusion technologies.
Case 1 Concavity. When β ∈ (0, 1), the confusion technology γ is concave in the number of
complex prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1) > γ(n−m+ 1)− γ(n−m) ,
so that a firm’s incremental increase in price complexity is more effective in creating confusion
when rivals’price complexity is lower (in the sense that fewer competitors employ k̄).
Case 2 Convexity. When β > 1, the confusion technology γ is convex in the number of complex
prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1) < γ(n−m+ 1)− γ(n−m) ,
so that a firm’s incremental increase in price complexity is more effective when rivals’price com-
plexity is higher.
The LHS differences in Cases 1 and 2 capture the increase in the share of confused consumers
triggered by a unilateral increase in complexity when n −m − 1 other firms use k̄ (and m rivals
use k), while the RHS differences capture the corresponding increase when n−m other firms use
k̄ (and m rivals use k).





γmax − γ(n− 1)
βn−1
.
get confused. However, this does not change the results qualitatively.
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βn − 1 for β 6= 1 . (3)
The share of confused consumers for given n−m can be expressed in terms of the primitives of the
model: the market structure (n), the curvature of the confusion technology (β), and the highest
possible share of confused consumers (γmax). In our model, ceteris paribus, changes in γmax trigger
changes in γ(n−m) for any n−m. For this reason, γmax can be used as a measure of the degree
of consumer sophistication, with a higher value corresponding to lower sophistication.8
Case 3 Linearity. When β = 1, the price complexity of one firm does not affect the effectiveness
of an increase in a rival’s complexity. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1) = γ(n−m+ 1)− γ(n−m) .
In this case, which is closely related to Carlin (2009), (3) is replaced by
γ(n−m) = γmax(n−m)
n
for β = 1 . (4)
The main analysis focuses on β 6= 1, but a characterization of the equilibrium for β = 1 is
included at the end of section 5 and the policy discussion in section 6 covers all cases.
As the share of confused consumers is assumed to be a symmetric function of firms’ price
complexity levels, in the setting above it is expressed as a function of the count of k̄ in k. Alterna-
tively, the share of confused consumers could be written as a function of the profile of firms’price
complexity choices, ϕ(k). Then, Case 1 corresponds to a situation where there is substitutabil-
ity in confusion (i.e., the confusion technology ϕ satisfies strictly decreasing differences), while
Case 2 corresponds to a situation where there is complementarity in confusion (i.e., the confusion
technology ϕ satisfies strictly increasing differences).9 Further details are relegated to the online
appendix.
Our reduced form model accommodates various interpretations. It can be related to an envi-
ronment where consumers have limited time and incur a time cost to assess firms’offers, so that
they use a two-step approach. Depending on the available time and the overall market complexity,
they first decide whether to collect information on prices or not. They can directly observe the
overall market complexity, e.g., they may receive information amalgamated by the media or social
networks or transmitted via word-of-mouth. However, they do not observe individual firms’com-
plexity levels unless they decide to collect information. Complexity focuses consumers’attention
to this particular aspect and may dissuade them from gathering price information. The consumers
who decide to gather information buy the lowest-price product and the others select a product
8 It can also be shown that if γ(0) ∈ (0, 1), the share of confused consumers when exactly n −m firms use k̄ is
equal to the expression in (3) plus a constant equal to γ(0).
9See Vives (1999, Ch. 2) for general discussion of strategic substitutability and complementarity which relates to
profits. However, here, substitutability and complementarity do not relate to firms’profits.
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randomly. The online appendix formalizes the interpretation of consumer confusion rooted in the
cost of processing information and provides further discussion.
Our analysis is related to Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). How-
ever, these papers analyze the impact of price complexity (and, more generally, framing) on the
price comparability structure. In contrast, the interpretation presented above focuses on markets
where consumers use a two-stage decision making process. Here, by making gains from comparisons
or switching less obvious, complexity may discourage information gathering or reinforce inertia.
Our model is also consistent with a default-bias interpretation, whereby each consumer is initially
assigned to one firm and the firms have equal bases of consumers ex-ante. In this case, confused
consumers uphold their default option, while the experts select the cheapest alternative.
3 Preliminary Findings
Given competitors’price and price complexity choices (p−i,k−i), firm i’s ex post profit can be
written as







where firm i’s share of informed consumers, qi(pi,p−i), is given below.
qi(pi,p−i) =

1 if pi < min{pj , 1} for j ∈ N , j 6= i ;
1
|H| if pi = pj ≤ 1, for j ∈ H ⊆ N , and pl > pi, for l ∈ N \H, j, l 6= i ;
0 if pi > min{pj , 1} for j ∈ N , j 6= i .
The first term in square brackets in πi is firm i’s share of confused consumers, while the second
term is firm i’s share of experts. All experts buy from firm i if its price is strictly lower than rivals’
prices. If firm i and other firms tie at the lowest price, then they share equally the experts. If at
least one firm j 6= i offers a price pj lower than pi, then firm i does not sell to experts.
Although confused consumers cannot assess prices, they do not pay more than their valuation.
A justification for this assumption is that, if firms charge prices above v = 1, the consumers would
realize at checkout (or after purchase) and decline the purchase (or return the product free of
cost). Therefore, the firms have no incentives to charge prices in excess of consumers’willingness
to pay.10
We first explore pure complexity strategy equilibria. If all firms choose k for sure, they make
zero profits. But then a unilateral deviation to k̄ allows a firm to make positive profit on its
confused consumer base. If some firms use k̄ and others use k, there are both expert and confused
consumers. Varian (1980) implies that the firms mix on prices from a closed interval. But if a
k̄-firm deviates to k and sets the lowest price, it makes higher profit. At that price, the firm serves
10However, it can be shown that our results are robust in a setting where confused consumers may be able to pay
v > 1, for v small enough.
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all the experts and, although the deviation to k decreases the firm’s confused consumers base, this
loss is more than compensated by the gain in the share of experts. The proof of the following
lemma formalizes and completes these arguments.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium where all firms use pure price complexity strategies.
Proof. (a) Suppose that ki = k for all i ∈ N (i.e., γ(0) = 0). Then, firms compete à la
Bertrand and make zero profit. If a firm unilaterally deviates to k̄ and price p ∈ (0, 1), it makes
strictly positive profit. A contradiction.
(b) Suppose exactly n − m firms use k̄ (for m ≥ 1). (a) implies that m < n. Then there are
1 − γ(n − m) experts and γ(n − m) > 0 confused consumers, and the results in Varian (1980)
apply. The unique candidate equilibrium dictates mixed strategy pricing according to a c.d.f. on
[p0, 1] and each firm’s expected profit is γ(n−m)/n = p0 [1− γ(n−m)(n− 1)/n]. But, if one of
the n −m firms choosing k̄ deviates to (p0, k) it makes profit p0 [1− γ(n−m− 1)(n− 1)/n] >
p0 [1− γ(n−m)(n− 1)/n].
(c) Suppose all firms choose k̄ for sure (that is, there are γ(n) = γmax confused consumers). If
γmax < 1, the argument in (b) applies unchanged. If γmax = 1, then in the unique candidate
equilibrium pi = 1 and πi = 1/n for all i. But then if a firm unilaterally deviates to k and price
pi = 1 − ε, it obtains profit (1− ε) [γ(n− 1)/n+ (1− γ(n− 1))] > 1/n for ε < (1 − γ(n − 1))/
[1/(n− 1) + (1− γ(n− 1))].
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one firm randomizes its price com-
plexity. Therefore, with positive probability the firms face both experts and confused consumers.
The conflict between the incentives to fully exploit confused consumers and to vigorously compete
for the experts rules out equilibria involving pure price strategies; see Varian (1980) and Rosenthal
(1980). The proof of the following result is standard and therefore omitted.
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium where all firms use pure pricing strategies.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any equilibrium there must be dispersion in both price complex-
ities and prices. A firm’s strategy space is [0, 1] × {k, k̄}. Denote by ξi ≡ ξi(pi, ki) firm i’s mixed
strategy over price and price complexity. This analysis focuses on symmetric mixed strategies,
where F (p) is the marginal c.d.f. of firms’random prices, defined on an interval S ⊆ [0, 1], and
λ(p) and 1− λ(p) are the probabilities that price p ∈ S is associated with complexity level k and
k̄, respectively. Then, the overall probability of using k is
∫
p∈Sλ(p)dF (p) ∈ (0, 1).
The following result presents properties of the firms’pricing strategies.
Lemma 3 In symmetric equilibrium, (i) the support of the pricing distribution (S) is a connected
interval; (ii) if γmax < 1 the pricing c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while if γmax = 1, it is
continuous everywhere except possibly at the upper bound of S; and (iii) inf S = p0 > 0 and
supS = 1.
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The next sections build on these results to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies. Section 4 illustrates the approach in a simple duopoly model and presents some
preliminary comparative statics results. Section 5 analyzes a general oligopoly model, while section
6 discusses competition and consumer protection policy implications, by combining analytical
results and numerical simulations.
4 Duopoly Analysis
Consider a duopoly market and suppose firm j 6= i follows the mixed strategy ξj presented in
section 3. At a given price pj , firm j uses low complexity k with probability λ(pj) and high
complexity with probability 1− λ(pj). Firm j’s price is a random draw from its price c.d.f. Then,
firm i’s profit at price p ≥ p0 = minS > 0 and complexity k is given by
πi (p, k) = p
∫ 1
p





[λ(pj)γ(0) + (1− λ(pj))γ(1)] dF (pj) . (5)
For a given realization of rival’s price pj , the first square bracket gives the expected share of experts.
If firm j also uses k, which happens with probability λ(pj), the expert share is (1−γ(0)); if, instead,
it uses k̄, which happens with probability 1 − λ(pj), the expert share is (1 − γ(1)). Similarly, for
a given pj , the second square bracket gives the expected share of confused consumers. As firm j’s
price pj is a random draw, these expected shares are integrated over the relevant realizations of
pj . Firm i serves experts whenever the rival’s price is higher (pj > p), whereas it serves half of the
confused consumers for all pj’s.













[λ(pj)γ(1) + (1− λ(pj))γ(2)] dF (pj) . (6)
The terms in square brackets present the expected shares of experts and, respectively, confused
consumers for a given realization of rival’s price pj . In this case, if firm j chooses the low complexity
k - which happens with probability λ(pj) - there are (1−γ(1)) experts and γ(1) confused consumers.
If firm j chooses the high complexity k̄ - which happens with probability 1−λ(pj) - then there are
(1−γ(2)) = (1−γmax) experts and γ(2) = γmax confused consumers. Firm j’s price pj is a random
draw from its pricing c.d.f. The share of experts is integrated over all the price realizations where
firm i serves these consumers (i.e., for all pj > p). Firm i serves half of the confused consumers
for all pj’s.





































Expression (7) is strictly increasing in p: the first term in brackets (which is negative) decreases
as p increases (the integration range gets smaller), whereas the second term in brackets (which is
positive) increases as p increases (the integration range gets wider).
To maximize its expected profit, firm i chooses
k(p) =

k if p < p̂ ,
k̄ if p > p̂ ,
k, ∀k ∈ {k, k̄} if p = p̂ ,
(8)
where the threshold price p̂ follows from equating (7) to zero. So, in symmetric equilibrium, prices
below a cut-off level p̂ > p0 are associated with k, while price above p̂ are associated with k̄, and
each firm assigns probability λ =
∫ 1
p0
λ(p)dF (p) = F (p̂) ∈ (0, 1) to low complexity (k) and 1−λ to
high complexity (k̄). A formal proof of this result is presented in the next section for the general
oligopoly model.
Suppose now that firm j 6= i uses the price complexity strategy identified above and that F (p)
satisfies Lemma 3. Then, firm i’s expected profits at p = p0 and when p→ p̂ are








πi (p, k) =
p̂
2
(1− λ)(2− γ(1)) ,















[λγ(1) + (1− λ)γmax] .
The expected profit for an arbitrary price p is presented in the appendix. The constant profit
conditions imply that in duopoly equilibrium the probability of using k̄ and a firm’s expected profit
are given by
1− λ = 1
β + 1
∈ (0, 1) and π = γmax (2β + 1)
2(β + 1)2
, (9)
while the boundary prices p0 and p̂ are
p0 =
γmax(2β + 1)
2(β + 1)2 − γmax
∈ (0, 1) and p̂ = γmax(2β + 1)
2(β + 1)− γmax
∈ (0, 1] . (10)
Note that p̂ = 1 iff γmax = 1.
Finally, F (p) is implicitly determined by π(k, p) = π and π(k̄, p) = π, and presented in the
appendix. For γmax = 1, the price distribution has a mass point at the upper bound of its support
as (1− F (1)) = 1/(β + 1).
Proposition 1 In the unique symmetric duopoly equilibrium, firms choose prices randomly accord-
ing to the c.d.f. F (p) presented in (A1). Prices on [p0, p̂) are associated with low price complexity




, with p0 and p̂ defined in
(10). Each firm chooses k with probability λ = F (p̂) and k̄ with probability 1 − λ, where λ is
presented in (9), along with a firm’s expected equilibrium profit, π.
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For γmax < 1, symmetric equilibrium price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere. In contrast, for
γmax = 1, p̂ = 1 and the equilibrium price distribution is continuous for all p < 1, but has an
atom at the upper bound as limp↗1F (p) = β/(β + 1) < F (1) = 1.11 There is dispersion in both
prices and complexity levels, a positive relationship between prices and complexity, and the firms’
strategies and market outcomes depend on both β and γmax.
Figure 1 illustrates symmetric equilibrium price c.d.f.s for given γmax and two values of β. Solid
lines correspond to prices associated with k, while dashed lines correspond to k̄.






Figure 1: Symmetric equilibrium pricing distributions for γmax = .4. The lower c.d.f. is for
β = 1/2 (with p0 = 0.195, p̂ = 0.307, and π = 0.178). The upper c.d.f. is for β = 2 (with
p0 = 0.113, p̂ = 0.357 and π = 0.111).
Our analysis distinguishes between two properties of the confusion technology, the convex-
ity/concavity (captured by β) and consumer sophistication (captured by γmax), and separates their
comparative statics effects. In duopoly, the curvature is given by a unique ratio, β = (γmax−γ(1))/
(γ(1)−γ(0)) - see (2) for n = 2 - and the separation is straightforward. Although this is no longer
true with more than two firms, as we parametrize the curvature of the confusion technology, the
effects of β and γmax can still be isolated in our oligopoly model.
In duopoly, for β ∈ (0, 1), an increase in β translates into a reduction in the concavity of the
confusion technology: a firm’s attempt to confuse consumers is thwarted to a lesser extent by
rival’s use of high complexity. In contrast, for β > 1, an increase in β corresponds to an increase
in the convexity of the confusion technology, and so a firm’s attempt to confuse is magnified to a
higher extent by the rival’s use of high complexity.
Holding the curvature (β) fixed, expression (3) shows that with duopoly a change in the share
of confused consumers when both firms use k̄ (i.e., a change in γmax) triggers a change in the share
of confused consumers when only one firm uses k̄ (γ(1)).12
11When γmax = 1, p̂ = 1 so limp↗1 πi(p, k) = πi(1, k) and all the mass placed on k̄ is clustered at the upper bound
of the support.
12As in duopoly β = (γmax − γ(1))/ (γ(1)− γ(0)), then γ(1) = γmax/(β + 1).
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Corollary 1 In the symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using the low price complex-
ity (λ) increases in β, the lower bound of the pricing c.d.f. (p0) decreases in β, the cut-off price
(p̂) increases in β for γmax < 1 and is independent of β for γmax = 1, while the expected individual
profit (π), the expected industry profit (2π), the expected share of confused consumers, and the
average price decrease in β.
An increase in the curvature of the confusion technology (β) leads to more market transparency
and stronger competition: the firms put higher probability on k and the average price and expected
industry profit decrease. However, an increase in β also increases price dispersion (as p0 decreases).
As total welfare is constant (and normalized to one), the decrease in expected industry profit
corresponds to an equal increase in expected consumer surplus. Figure 2 illustrates how the
probability of using k and expected industry profit vary with β, for given γmax.





Figure 2: Probability of using k (dash, increasing) and expected industry profit (solid, decreasing)
as functions of β for n = 2 and γmax = 0.4.
For intuition on why the curvature makes a difference, take a situation where both firms use
k̄ and so the share of confused consumers is γmax. As both firms use k̄, they set prices above p̂.
Consider a unilateral deviation from k̄ to k and a price below p̂, where the deviator aims to attract
the experts. In duopoly β = (γmax − γ(1))/ (γ(1)− γ(0)) and, as γ(0) = 0, this deviation reduces
the share of confused consumers to γ(1) = γmax/(β + 1). Clearly, as β increases, the deviation is
more effective as the reduction in the confused consumer share is larger.
Take now a situation where both firms use k and so the share of confused consumers is γ(0) = 0.
As both firms use k, they set prices below p̂. Consider a unilateral deviation from k to k̄ and a
price above p̂. The deviator targets the confused consumers and the deviation increases the share
of confused consumers to γ(1) = γmax/(β + 1) > 0. As β increases, the deviation is less effective
as the increase in the confused consumer share is smaller.
Consider a situation where one firm uses k and the other k̄. The k̄ - firm sells only to its share
of confused consumers, that is, to γ(1)/2 = γmax/2(β + 1) consumers (this is because its price is
higher than p̂, while the rival’s price is lower than p̂). If this firm deviates to k and a lower price,
its expected market share is 1/2. So, the market share gain from the deviation is β/2(β+1) and is
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increasing in the convexity of the confusion technology, β. Combining the three arguments, firms
always have a greater incentive to choose low complexity when β is higher.
For a more formal analysis of the role of β, consider firm i’s incentives at the cut-off price p̂. At
this price, firm i is indifferent between using low and high price complexity. Proposition 1 implies
that when firm i sets price p̂, firm j has a higher price for sure when it uses kj = k̄, whereas firm
j has a lower price for sure when it chooses kj = k. So, when firm i sets price p̂, the experts buy
from firm i if firm j chooses k̄ and they buy from firm j if firm j chooses k. Then, if the rival uses
k̄ - which happens with probability (1−λ) - when firm i increases its complexity from k to k̄, there
is a reduction in the share of experts and an increase in firm i’s share of confused consumers. The
net (negative) change in firm i’s market share is








≡ Γ1 , (11)
where the equality follows from (3). If the rival uses k - which happens with probability (λ) - when








≡ Γ2 . (12)
In equilibrium, firm j’s probability of choosing k (λ) balances the expected loss and the expected
gain, that is, (1−λ)Γ1+λΓ2 = 0. Keeping λ fixed, following an increase in β, as both dΓ1/dβ < 0
and dΓ2/dβ < 0, firm i strictly prefers k to k̄ at price p̂ and so the price where firm i is indifferent
between k and k̄ is strictly higher than p̂. Therefore, following an increase in β, a firm has a
stronger incentive to use k, which underlies the comparative statics of λ with respect to β in
Corollary 1. In duopoly markets, the generality of this argument can be highlighted by using the






+ λ = 0⇔ −(1− λ)β + λ = 0 ,
where the fraction measures the concavity/convexity of the confusion technology (and is equal to
β). Using the implicit function theorem, this expression shows that an increase in the convexity
(or decrease in the concavity) of the confusion technology will trigger an increase in λ.
Note also that when fixing λ, an increase in convexity (decrease in concavity) leads to a de-
crease in the expected share of confused consumers.13 This decrease makes the firms rely less on
confused consumers and increases their incentives to use low complexity, triggering an increase in
the equilibrium value of λ.
While average prices decrease in β, it is less obvious how the average price conditional on
low complexity varies with β. For instance, in Figure 1, an increase in β from 1/2 to 2 triggers
an increase in the cumulative probability at each price p which was assigned positive density for
β = 1/2 and also a decrease in p0. These two effects indicate that the average price for β = 2





m(1− λ)2−mγ(2−m) = γmax[β(1− λ)2 +
1− λ2]/ (β + 1) and it is easy to check that it decreases in β for λ ∈ (0, 1).
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is lower than that for β = 1/2. However, the change in the average price conditional on low
complexity is affected by an additional effect which partly offsets these two, as the cut-off price p̂
increases in β. Using (A1), the price distribution conditional on the price being below the cut-off
value p̂ and the corresponding conditional expected price are presented in the appendix. It can
be checked that the expected price conditional on low complexity is not generally monotonic in β.
For instance, for γmax = 0.4, it increases for low values of β and then decreases, while for γmax =
1, it monotonically decreases in β.14
Corollary 2 In symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using low price complexity (λ)
is independent of γmax, while the lower bound of the pricing c.d.f. (p0), the cut-off price (p̂),
expected individual profit (π), expected industry profit (2π), expected share of confused consumers,
the average price, and the average price conditional on low complexity, all increase in γmax.
As discussed below Corollary 1, the equilibrium λmakes a firm indifferent between low and high
price complexity at p̂. To isolate the comparative statics effect of γmax, the concavity/convexity
of the confusion technology (β = (γmax − γ(1))/ (γ(1) − γ(0)) is held constant. Then, as it can
be seen from expressions (11) and (12), consumer sophistication (γmax) can be factored out of
(1− λ)Γ1 + λΓ2 = 0, and so the equilibrium value of λ is independent of γmax.
An implication of Corollary 2, is that consumer policies which increase the degree of consumer
sophistication, for instance, financial literacy programmes, decrease the average prices and the
expected share of confused consumers, and increase expected consumer surplus. However, they
increase price dispersion (by decreasing the lower bound of the pricing support, p0) and we identify
the possibility that they may not affect market transparency as reflected by firms’probability of
choosing low complexity. These results suggest that market transparency and price dispersion may
not be good indicators of the success of consumer education programmes or of market performance.
5 Oligopoly Equilibrium
This section characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in oligopoly markets. It mainly focuses on a
framework where the confusion technology is either concave or convex in firms’price complexity
levels (where β ≶ 1), but also includes a variant without second order effects (β = 1).
Consider an arbitrary firm i ∈ N . Suppose that firm i’s competitors follow the mixed strategy
presented in section 3. Then, the competitors choose prices randomly from a distribution function
F (p) which satisfies Lemma 3, the probability that a (random) price p is associated with the low
complexity k is given by λ(p), and the probability that p is associated with high complexity k̄ is
1− λ(p). Although firm i’s competitors choose prices from the same c.d.f., their price draws may
be different and so the probabilities of using k may also be different across these firms.
Let ℘(N−i) be the power set of N−i = N \{i} and Mm = {M ⊂ ℘(N−i) | |M | = m}. ℘(N−i) is
the set of all subsets of N−i and Mm is the set of all subsets of ℘(N−i) of cardinality m. Consider
14When γmax = 0.4, the expected price conditional on low complexity is 0.25115 for β = 0.05, 0.25149 for β = 0.15,
and 0.24292 for β = 0.5.
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the overall probability that out of n− 1 rivals exactly m ≥ 0 use k and n−m− 1 use k̄.
Example 1 Let n = 3, N−i = {j, l}, and p−i = (pj , pl). Using (13), P22 = λ(pj)λ(pl), P12 =
[λ(pj)(1− λ(pl)) + (1− λ(pj))λ(pl)] , and P02 = (1 − λ(pj))(1 − λ(pl)). In this case, ℘(N−i) =
{∅, {j}, {l}, {j, l}}, M2 = {j, l}, M1 = {{j}, {l}}, and M0 = {∅}.
Using (13), firm i’s expected profit at price p ≥ p0 = minS > 0 and complexity k is given by
























dF (pj)...dF (pl) .
The first term in πi (p, k) corresponds to firm i’s profit on the expert consumer segment. When
out of n − 1 rivals exactly m ≥ 0 use k and n −m − 1 use k̄, given that firm i also employs k,
there are γ(n − m − 1) confused consumers and (1 − γ(n − m − 1)) experts. The first term in
square brackets sums up over all values of m. Firm i serves experts only if its price is lower than
rivals’prices, which is reflected when integrating over pj > p for all j 6= i. The second term is firm
i’s profit on the confused consumer segment. Firm i serves a share 1/n of these consumers. The
second term in square brackets sums the corresponding share of confused consumers γ(n−m− 1)
over all values of m. Firm i serves its share of confused consumers regardless of rivals’prices,
which is reflected by integrating over pj > p0 for all j 6= i.





























dF (pj)...dF (pl) .




is analogous to the one for πi (p, k) , with the difference that, when
exactly m ≥ 0 out of n−1 rivals use k, as firm i employs k̄, there are γ(n−m) confused consumers
and (1− γ(n−m)) experts.































dF (pj)...dF (pk) .
This expression can be simplified using the following result which draws on (3).
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Lemma 4 Suppose n ≥ 2 and m ≤ n−1. Let p−i be the ex post price profile of firm i’s competitors
and Λ(pj) ≡ [1 + (1− λ(pj))(β − 1)], where pj is an element of p−i. Then,
n−1∑
m=0



























This expression generalizes the incremental profitability of an increase in complexity presented in
section 4, and similar reasoning leads to the next result.
Proposition 2 In symmetric mixed-strategy oligopoly equilibrium, a firm’s complexity level de-
pends only on its price. The firms choose prices according to a c.d.f. F (p) with support S = [p0, 1].
If p < p̂ the firms choose complexity k, if p > p̂ the firms choose complexity k̄, and if p = p̂ the
firms are indifferent between the two complexity levels.
When a firm chooses relatively low prices, it benefits from more market transparency, as it is
more likely to serve the experts. In contrast, when a firm chooses relatively high prices, it relies
more on confused consumers and benefits from higher complexity. As a result, in equilibrium there
is a positive relationship between prices and price complexity levels and a firm’s complexity choice
is determined by its price draw. Each firm assigns probability λ = F (p̂) ∈ (0, 1) to complexity
level k and 1− λ to complexity level k̄.
The proof of the next result uses the approach illustrated in section 4 and is relegated to the
appendix. Drawing on Proposition 2, a firm’s expected profit for a price p ∈ [p0, p̂) (which is
associated with k) and for a price p ∈ [p̂, 1] (which is associated with k̄), and mixed strategy
equilibrium constant profit conditions are also presented there. Recall that γ(n) = γmax.
Proposition 3 For n ≥ 2 and β 6= 1, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where the firms
choose prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) defined on [p0, 1] where p0 > 0. Each firm
chooses complexity k̄ with probability 1− λ = 1− F (p̂), where
1− λ = n
−1/(n−1)
1 + (β − 1)(1− n−1/(n−1))
∈ (0, 1) , (15)
and complexity k with probability λ. Each firm’s expected profit is
π = γmax
[
n(1− λ)n−1βn − 1
]
n (βn − 1) . (16)
If γmax < 1, then p̂ < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If γmax = 1, then p̂ = 1 and F (p) is
continuous for p ∈ [p0, p̂), but has an atom at p̂.
In homogeneous product markets, where firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and
price complexity levels, there is dispersion in both dimensions in equilibrium. These findings are
consistent with observed patters in markets for financial and banking products, or markets for gas
17
and electricity. Firms make strictly positive profits and charge prices in excess of marginal cost.
The firms’equilibrium strategies and market outcomes depend on market structure (as captured
by n), the curvature of the confusion technology (β), and the degree of consumer sophistication
(γmax).
A Model without Second Order Effects
So far, the focus has been on β 6= 1. Below, a variant of the model where β = 1 (and so the
confusion technology is linear) is discussed. The preliminary results in Lemmas 1-3 carry over
unchanged. The β = 1 case is closely related to the analysis in Carlin (2009). There, the firms
choose complexity levels from a closed interval [k, k̄], but in symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
they randomize only between the extreme values of this interval. His analysis proves the existence
of a cut-off mixed strategy equilibrium. The next result fully characterizes the unique symmetric
equilibrium of a variant with binary price complexity levels (ki ∈ {k, k̄}). The proof is relegated
to the online appendix.
Proposition 4 For n ≥ 2 and β = 1, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where firms choose
prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) defined on [p0, 1] where p0 > 0. Each firm chooses
complexity k̄ with probability 1− λ = 1− F (p̂), given by
1− λ = n−
1
n−1 ∈ (0, 1) , (17)









If γmax < 1, then p̂ < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If γmax = 1, then p̂ = 1 and F (p) is
continuous for p ∈ [p0, p̂) but has an atom at p̂.
6 Discussion and Policy Implications
This section explores equilibrium comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses their
implications for competition and consumer protection policy. Building on Propositions 3 and 4,
it focuses on the impact of changes in the number of firms (n), the degree of consumer sophisti-
cation (γmax), and the concavity or convexity of the confusion technology (β) on the equilibrium
probability of using low complexity, the expected share of confused consumers, and the expected
industry profit.
6.1 Probability of Using Low Complexity
Corollary 3 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that each firm assigns
to the low complexity level k (λ) decreases in the number of firms (n), is independent of the
degree of consumer sophistication (γmax), and increases in the degree of convexity β. Moreover,
limn→∞ λ = 0.
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Consistent with existing results, as the number of competitors increases, firms rely more on
consumer confusion and so choose high price complexity more frequently. In the limit, as the
number of competitors goes to infinity, the firms use high price complexity almost surely. Hence,
in settings where firms compete by choosing both prices and price complexity, an increase in the
number of firms leads to an increase in the overall complexity of the market. Like in our duopoly
framework, the frequency with which firms use low complexity is independent of consumers’degree
of sophistication. So, we identify the possibility that initiatives which improve consumer awareness
may not lead to reductions in the overall market complexity.
For a given number of firms, a lower degree of concavity or higher degree of convexity of the
confusion technology leads to a decrease in market complexity. When β ∈ (0, 1), higher complexity
of rivals’offers reduces the increase in confusion resulting from a firm’s incremental complexity.
However, when β increases, this reduction gets smaller and λ increases because a firm’s incentives
to choose high complexity are reduced. When β > 1, higher rival complexity magnifies the increase
in confusion resulting from the incremental complexity of a firm’s offer and an increase in β further








Figure 3: Equilibrium probability of using k (λ) as a function of n. From bottom to top for β
equal to 0.5, 0.7, 1, 2, and 2.5.
6.2 Expected Share of Confused Consumers






For a given number of firms, exp[γ] aggregates the shares of confused consumers in the sequence
(γ(n−m))nm=0, weighting each share by the overall probability that m firms choose low complexity
and n −m firms choose high complexity. Using (3) for β 6= 1 and (4) for β = 1, the equilibrium
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expected share of confused consumers becomes
exp [γ] =
 γmax
[1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n − 1
βn − 1 for β 6= 1
γmax(1− λ) for β = 1
. (19)
To focus on the impact of the confusion technology’s curvature on market outcomes, the com-
parative statics and convergence results below assume that the upper bound of the share of confused
consumers is independent of the number of firms, i.e. γ(n) = γmax is a constant. By fixing the
maximal share of confused consumers, when the number of firms is increased, each firm is made
smaller with respect to the market, as its maximal base of confused consumers is γmax/ n.
15
The convergence properties of the expected share of confused consumers with respect to the
number of firms depend on whether the confusion technology is concave or convex in firms’com-
plexity choices.
Corollary 4 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected share of confused con-





γmax for β ∈ (0, 1]
0 for β > 1
.
If the confusion technology is convex, the expected share of confused consumers converges to
zero as the number of firms goes to infinity. For simplicity, this analysis assumes that γ(0) = 0
(i.e., when all firms use low complexity, there are no confused consumers). If γ(0) > 0 instead (i.e.,
if some consumers get confused even when all firms use k), then with convex confusion technology,
the expected share of confused consumers would converge instead to the minimal level, γ(0); see
footnote 2. In contrast, if the confusion technology is concave (β ∈ (0, 1)), the expected share of
confused consumers is bounded away from zero and converges to γmax as the number of firms goes
to infinity.
The curvature of the confusion technology in this model is captured by the sequence of shares
(γ(n−m))nm=0. A simple illustration is provided below.
Example 2 Consider (3). If β = 2, then γ(n−m) = γmax(2n−m−1)/ (2n−1) and limn→∞ γ(n−
m) = γmax2
−m. If β = 1/2, then γ(n−m) = γmax(0.5n−m−1)/ (0.5n−1) and limn→∞ γ(n−m) =
γmax.
In relatively large oligopoly markets, convexity requires a relatively ineffective confusion tech-
nology and, although the firms use almost surely high complexity, the expected share of confused
consumers converges to zero. In contrast, concavity requires a relatively effective confusion tech-
nology. In nearly competitive markets with concave confusion technology, as the firms use almost
surely high complexity, the expected share of confused consumers is close to the highest level. This
is also the case with linear confusion technology, so the results for β = 1 are qualitatively similar
to those that obtain under concavity.
15For a discussion of comparative statics in large oligopoly markets, see Chapter 5.2.5. in Vives (2001).
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Beyond the convergence results presented in Corollary 4, numerical simulations indicate that
the expected number of confused consumers, exp[γ], increases monotonically in n for β ∈ (0, 1].
For β = 1, this monotonicity result can be derived analytically using Corollary 3. For all β > 1,
exp[γ] decreases in n at least when n is large enough. For β ≥ 2, its value at n = 2 is larger
than the value at n = 3, and then exp[γ] decreases monotonically in n for n ≥ 3.16 However, for
β ∈ (1, 1.8) it peaks at some value n0(β) ≥ 3. Numerical examples also indicate that the expected
share of confused consumers strictly decreases in β for given n and increases in γmax.
Example 3 Let γmax = 1. Consider β = 1/2, 1, or 2. The expected share of confused consumers
as a function of the number of firms is illustrated in Figure 4 and presented in the appendix.








Figure 4: Expected share of confused consumers in equilibrium for γmax = 1. From bottom to top
for β = 2, β = 1, and β = 1/2.
As our analysis holds the maximal share of confused consumers fixed, the number of firms does
not have a direct impact on consumer sophistication (as measured by γmax). Suppose instead that
the maximal share of confused consumers (γmax = γ(n)) is an increasing function of the number
of firms (n). This could be the case in a market where there is choice overload and consumers
are more likely to make random choices when they face more options. Using (19), it is easy to
see that the qualitative results in Corollary 4 carry over unchanged. For β > 1, γ(n) is bounded
above by γmax, so that in the limit, the expected share of confused consumers still goes to zero.
For β ∈ (0, 1], the expected share of confused consumers converges to limn→∞ γ(n) > γ(2) > 0.
Now, suppose that γ(n) is a decreasing function of n, that is, the larger the number of firms,
the higher the minimal share of experts is. Arguably, this is a less realistic case as it requires the
number of firms in the market to have a positive impact on consumer sophistication as measured
by the maximal share of confused consumers. For β > 1, γ(n) is bounded below by zero, so the
expected share of confused consumers still converges to zero. However, for β ∈ (0, 1], the expected
share of confused consumers may converge to zero as almost all consumers are sophisticated in
16For β ∈ [2, 2.15), the expected number of confused is an inverted U function of n, but reaches a maximum at
some n0(β) ∈ (2, 3).
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nearly competitive markets. See also the examples in Carlin, 2009 (section 4, p. 284): in the first
one, like in this analysis, the maximal share of confused consumers is independent of n, while in
the second it decreases with n.
6.3 Expected Industry Profit
Corollary 5 In symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, expected industry profit (πn = nπ) in-





γmax for β ∈ (0, 1]
0 for β > 1
.
An increase in the level of consumer sophistication has a positive effect on expected consumer
surplus (as total welfare is normalized to one). Note that in this model consumer surplus is only
determined by equilibrium prices. In practice price complexity might directly affect consumers,
for instance, by raising their information gathering or processing costs. This would be the case,
for instance, if the experts require more time to identify the lowest price when complexity is
higher. Combined with the findings in Corollary 3, this implies that an improvement in consumer
awareness boosts consumer surplus, but this may not be reflected by a reduction in overall market
complexity. Hence, the insight from the duopoly model that market transparency may not be a
good indicator of market performance carries over to oligopoly settings.
In nearly perfectly competitive markets, when the confusion technology is concave, or when it
is linear, expected industry profit is bounded away from zero. As expected total profit is larger
than the expected share of confused consumers, this result is closely related to Corollary 4. On
the other hand, when the confusion technology is convex, expected profit converges to zero as the
number of firms converges to infinity. In this case, although firms choose high complexity almost
surely, the confusion technology is relatively ineffi cient and markets with many firms may be highly
competitive.
In general, industry profit and implicitly consumer surplus are not monotonic in the number
of firms. An increase in the number of competitors gives firms stronger incentives to undercut and
attract the experts, but also to use more frequently high complexity (k̄), which is associated with
relatively higher prices. Numerical simulations also suggest that industry profit decreases in β for
given γmax and n. Figure 5 provides an illustration for γmax = 1 and Table 1 presents equilibrium
outcomes for various values of n and β, when γmax = 0.4.
In the table, p0 decreases in n for given β and in β for given n, whereas p̂ decreases in n for
β = 1/2, it increases in n for β = 1 and β = 2, and it increases in β for given n. Expected industry


















Figure 5: Equilibrium industry profit (πn) as a function of n for γmax = 1 and values of β.
in n for β = 2, and decreases in β for given n.
Table 1 (γmax = 0.4)
β n λ π πn p0 p̂ exp[γ]
1/2 3 0.268 0.122 0.365 0.149 0.275 0.852
1/2 4 0.227 0.094 0.377 0.125 0.254 0.916
1/2 10 0.127 0.04 0.4 0.062 0.185 0.998
1 3 0.423 0.096 0.287 0.107 0.324 0.578
1 4 0.370 0.072 0.289 0.084 0.325 0.63
1 10 0.226 0.032 0.320 0.043 0.347 0.774
2 3 0.594 0.056 0.169 0.058 0.363 0.254
2 4 0.540 0.034 0.14 0.036 0.374 0.236
2 10 0.368 0.006 0.064 0.007 0.399 0.13
In a discussion of models where framing limits the comparability of competing offers, Spiegler
(2016) introduces a property called ‘enforceable comparability’ (EC).17 When EC is satisfied,
industry profit is independent of the number of firms. However, in settings where a unilateral
increase in the price format (or complexity level) leads to more consumer confusion irrespective
of the rivals’ choices, EC is not satisfied. This is the case here, in Carlin (2009), and in parts
of the analysis in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). The latter analysis identifies the possibility that
industry profit may be non-monotonic in the number of firms. The current analysis contributes
17 Intuitively, ‘enforceable comparability’is satisfied if there exists a probability distribution over the set of formats
which equalizes a firm’s expected share of confused consumers across all frame choices for any frame profile of the
rivals.
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by providing a novel taxonomy of the impact of the number of firms on industry profits when EC
fails. In particular, it shows that in a Carlin-type setting the curvature of the confusion technology
drives the convergence properties of expected industry profit in large markets.
Our results may provide policy guidance by distinguishing when a focus on the number of
firms is desirable in large markets. From an empirical perspective, the confusion technology can
be approximated by using information on the degree of market complexity and on the share of
consumers who make suboptimal choices for a given number of firms. Recent analyses of retail
financial markets propose different measures of complexity, some of them related to the length of
product descriptions (e.g. number of pages or characters) or the number of technical terms (e.g.,
words that appear in the glossary); see, for instance, Célérier and Vallée (2017) and Ghent, Torous,
and Valkanov (2017). Using survey and consumer-level data from liberalized retail utility markets,
a fast-growing stream of empirical work develops methods to estimate preferences in markets with
search frictions and finds evidence of consumer inertia and confusion; see, for example, Hortaçsu,
Madanizadeh, and Puller (2017) and the references therein.
In practice, consumer protection intervention or market developments might influence the pat-
terns of consumer behavior and, implicitly, the characteristics of the confusion technology. For
instance, price format standardization might facilitate consumer learning by doing and have an
impact on the curvature of the confusion technology. Online technologies which facilitate infor-
mation sharing in markets may have similar effects. Our results suggest that such interventions
or developments affect market performance and may have to be taken into consideration in the
design of competition policy and in the assessment of its interaction with consumer policy.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes a homogeneous product market where firms compete by choosing both prices
and price complexity levels. Complexity makes it harder for consumers to assess prices and identify
the best offer, and is a source of consumer confusion. A distinctive feature of the proposed model
is that it accommodates more general confusion technologies and, implicitly, consumer behav-
iors. Our analysis distinguishes between two properties of the confusion technology, its curvature
(concavity or convexity) with respect to the overall complexity and the degree of consumer so-
phistication, and isolates their comparative statics effects. To separate these effects and develop a
tractable framework, the oligopoly model parametrizes the curvature of the confusion technology.
Our results suggest that confusion technology characteristics have an impact on market out-
comes and implications for competition and consumer protection policy. An increase in the number
of competitors leads to an increase in market complexity but, in relatively small markets, it has
ambiguous effects on consumer surplus. In large markets, firms use high price complexity almost
surely and, if the confusion technology is convex, expected industry profits converge to zero. In
large markets with concave or linear confusion technology, expected industry profits converge to
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the highest level. An improvement in consumer sophistication boosts consumer surplus but may
not reduce overall market complexity. Therefore, the effectiveness of interventions which increase




Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Let S̃ be the convex hull of S. Suppose there is a gap G ⊂ S̃. Let
A = {p ∈ S | p ≤ inf G}, pa = maxA and p′ = supG. Clearly, pa ∈ S and F (pa) = F (p′). But
then πi(p′, k, ξj) > πi(pa, k, ξj). A contradiction.
(ii) (a) Suppose there is a mass point at some p′ ∈ S with 0 < p′ < maxS. Then, there is a
positive probability of a tie at this price. (a1) If λ(p′) > 0, the expected share of experts at this
price is strictly positive when all firms tie. Then, firm i is better off deviating to p′− ε as there is a
discrete increase in market share and only a marginal decrease in price. This deviation applies also
at p′ = maxS, so that firms cannot have a mass point at the upper bound of S. (a2) If λ(p′) = 0,
the share of confused consumers at this price is γmax. If γmax < 1, the argument in (a1) applies
unchanged. If γmax = 1, in the event of a tie at p
′, all consumers are confused and firm i is better
off moving mass from price p′ to price p = maxS. Note that this argument does not rule out a
mass point at the upper bound of S when γmax = 1. (c) Suppose there is a mass point at p
′ = 0.
In this case, all firms make zero profits. If λ(p′) < 1, then there are some confused consumers when
firms tie at this price and firm i is better off deviating to p = 1 and making positive profits on its
share of confused consumers. If λ(p′) = 0, all consumers are experts when firms tie, but then firm
i is better off deviating to p = 1 and ki = k̄, where it makes positive profit.
(iii) It follows from (i) that in symmetric equilibrium S is a bounded interval. Suppose ph =
supS < 1. If γmax < 1, by (ii) firms pricing c.d.f.s are continuous everywhere, so a firm charging
p→ ph sells only to its share of confused consumers and it is clearly better off deviating to a higher
price p = 1. If γmax = 1, there may be a positive probability of a tie at ph but, as all consumers
are confused when all firms tie, deviating to p = 1 is profitable. A contradiction. As ph = 1,
firms’expected profit in the mixed strategy equilibrium will be strictly positive, so it must be that
p0 = minS > 0.
8.2 Duopoly Analysis
Expected Profits
Using (8), we re-write a firm’s expected profits. If firm i chooses complexity k and charges a
price p ∈ [p0, p̂), as γ(0) = 0, (5) becomes
πi (p, k) = p
[




















The symmetric equilibrium price distribution is presented below.









for p ∈ [p0, p̂)
γmax (2β + 1)






for p ∈ [p̂, 1], if γmax < 1
(A1)
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to see that λ, p0, p̂, and F (p) as presented in (9), (10),
and (A1) are all well defined.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p0, k). The deviator’s market share is equal to that corre-
sponding to p = p0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not profitable.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p > p̂, k). This results in deviation profit
πd (p, k) = p
[




















The inequality follows as, for p > p̂,
(






(1− F (p))(γ(2)− γ(1))− λ(γ(1)− γ(0))
2




















Consider a unilateral deviation to
(
p < p̂, k̄
)














π (p, k) = p
[




















(γ(2)− γ(1))−2(λ− F (p))− β(1− λ) + λ
2β
< (γ(2)− γ(1))−β(1− λ) + λ
2β
= 0 .




m(1− λ)2−mγ(2−m) = γmax(3β + 1)
(β + 1)3
. (A2)
For γmax > 0 is strictly lower than expected industry profits.
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Proof of Corollary 1. Using (9), dλ/dβ = 1/(β + 1)2 > 0 .
Using (10), dp0/dβ = −2γmax[γmax+ 2(β + 1)β]/
(
2(β + 1)2 − γmax
)2
< 0 .
Using (10), dp̂/dβ = 2γmax(1− γmax)/ [2(β + 1)− γmax]2 ≥ 0, with equality iff γmax = 1 .
Using (9), dπ/dβ = (1/2)(dπ2/dβ) = −γmaxβ/ (β + 1)3 < 0 .
Differentiating (A2) w.r.t. β gives −6γmaxβ/(β + 1)4 < 0 .
Using (A1), E(p) =
∫ p̂
p0
(1− F (p)) dp+
∫ 1
p̂ (1− F (p)) dp+ p0. By Leibniz’s rule,
dE(p)/dβ = (1− F (p̂)) (dp̂/dβ)− (1− F (p0)) dp0/dβ +∫ p̂
p0
(−dF (p)/dβ) dp− (1− F (p̂)) (dp̂/dβ)+
∫ 1




p̂ (−dF (p)/dβ) dp .
But, for p ∈ [p0, p̂), using (A1), dF (p)/dβ = γmax(β+p)/ (β+1)3p > 0. For p ∈ [p̂, 1] and γmax < 1,
dF (p)/dβ = γmaxβ(1−p)/ (β+1)3(1−γmax)p > 0. Then it follows that dE(p)/dβ < 0. For γmax =
1, p̂ = 1 and the second integral in E(p) is a constant, so dE(p)/dβ =
∫ p̂
p0
(−dF (p)/dβ) dp < 0.
Conditional Price Distribution. The price distribution conditional on the price being below
the cut-off value p̂ and the corresponding conditional expected price are given by
F (p | p < p̂) = F (p)/F (p̂) = 2(β + 1)
2 − γmax
2(β + 1)β
− γmax (2β + 1)
2(β + 1)βp
;
E(p | p < p̂) = γmax (2β + 1)
2(β + 1)β
ln
2(β + 1)2 − γmax
2(β + 1)− γmax
. (A3)
Proof of Corollary 2. Using (9), dλ/dγmax = 0 .
Using (10), dp0/dγmax = 2(2β + 1)(β + 1)
2/
[
2(β + 1)2 − γmax
]2
> 0 .
Using (10), dp̂/dγmax = 2(2β + 1)(β + 1)/ [2(β + 1)− γmax]2 > 0 .
Using (9), dπ/dγmax = (2β + 1)/ 2(β + 1)
2 > 0 .
Differentiating (A2) w.r.t. γmax gives −(3β + 1)/(β + 1)3 < 0 .
Using (A1), E(p) =
∫ p̂
p0
(1− F (p)) dp+
∫ 1




p̂ (−dF (p)/dγmax) dp.
But, for p ∈ [p0, p̂), using (A1), dF (p)/dγmax = −[(2β + 1)/p+ 1]/ 2(β + 1)2 < 0. For p ∈
[p̂, 1] and γmax < 1, dF (p)/dγmax = −(2β + 1)(1 − p)/ 2(β + 1)2γmaxp < 0. It follows that




(−dF (p)/dγmax) dp > 0.
Using (A3), it follows that
dE(p | p < p̂)/ dγmax ={
γmax (2β + 1)





2(β + 1)2 − γmax













































As we first sum over all values of m (for 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1), and then over all subsets of cardinality










Consider rival l’s price pl. Each term in the sum above contains either λ(pl) or (1− λ(pl)). In fact,
for each term in the summation which includes λ(pl), there is a ‘pair’which includes (1 − λ(pl))
and all other multipliers are the same. Formally, take some set M l ⊂ ℘(N−i) such that l ∈ M l.
Then, ∃M−l such that M l = M−l ∪ {l}. Pairing all such subsets, we can re-write the sum above
by factoring out the term [λ(pl) + (1− λ(pl))β]. So,













[λ(pj) + (1− λ(pj))β] = γ(1)
∏
j 6=i
[1 + (1− λ(pj))(β − 1)] .
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (14), let














πi(p, k)− πi(p, k)
pγ(1)
.
As Λ(pj) > 0 (see Lemma 4), it is easy to check that ∆(p0) < 0 and ∆(1) > 0. Furthermore, ∆(p)
is strictly increasing in p. As changes in p only affect the integration ranges in ∆(p),
d∆(p)
dp


























[1 + (1− λ(pjk))(β − 1))]dF (pjk)
}
> 0 .
So, to maximize its expected profit, a firm i chooses according to (8), where the threshold price
p̂ ∈ (p0, 1] satisfies ∆(p̂) = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Step 1: Expected Profits. At price p ∈ [p0, p̂), which is
associated with k, firm i’s expected profit is












When n − 1 −m competitors choose k̄ (and so price above p̂ ≥ p) and m competitors choose k
(which happens with probability λm(1− λ)n−1−m) firm i serves 1/n of the γ(n−m− 1) confused
consumers. It also serves (1− γ(n−m− 1)) experts whenever all m firms choosing k offer prices
higher than p (which happens with probability (λ−F (p))m(1− λ)n−1−m). This gives the term in
square brackets. The term in curly brackets considers all possible combinations of n− 1 taken m
and gives firm i’s market share at price p.
Then, firm i’s expected profits at p = p0 and when p→ p̂ are given below.












π (p̂, k) = p̂
[























When m competitors choose k (and so offer prices below p̂ < p) and n− 1−m competitors choose
k̄, firm i serves a share 1/n of the γ(n − m) confused consumers. The second term in square
brackets considers all possible combinations of n−1 taken m. Firm i serves expert consumers only
if all rivals choose high complexity (that is, if m = 0) and if it offers the lowest price, as reflected
by the first term in square brackets.















Step 2: Lambda. The equilibrium probability of choosing k̄ presented in (15) follows from,











m(1− λ)n−1−m(γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1))⇔









γ(1) [(1− λ)β]n−1 = γ(1)
n
[1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n−1 .
















































n (βn − 1)
{
β[1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n−1 − 1
}
.
Then Step 2 implies that [1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n−1 = n [(1− λ)β]n−1 and (16) follows.
Step 4: Equilibrium Boundary Prices and Pricing Distribution Functions.
I p0 and p̂ are defined by π(p0, k) = π and limp→p̂ π (p̂, k) = π, where the LHS terms are given in
(A4) and (A5), respectively, the RHS term is given by (16), and λ follows from (15).
Firm i’s market share at p0 - the term in curly brackets in (A4) - is larger than its market




m(1− λ)n−1−m(1− γ(n−m− 1)). This implies that p0 < p̂ as the equilibrium con-
stant profit condition requires π (p0, k) = limp→p̂ π (p̂, k).




















m(1− λ)n−1−m(γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1)) ≤ (1− λ)n−1(1− γ(n− 1))⇔
1
n
[λ+ (1− λ)β]n−1 − [(1− λ)β]n−1 ≤ (1− λ)n−1 (1− γ(n))
γ(1)
.
Expression (15) implies that the LHS is equal to zero. The RHS is nonnegative and may be equal
to zero only if γ(n) = 1. So p̂ < 1 if γ(n) < 1 and p̂ = 1 if γ(n) = 1.
Below, we focus on the pricing c.d.f.s. Note that π is defined in (16).
I For p ∈ [p0, p̂), F (p) is implicitly determined by π(k, p) = π.
Differentiating w.r.t. p both sides gives











Here, as F (p) < F (p̂) = λ, the summation is strictly positive. Then, F (p) is strictly increasing in
p.
For p ∈ [p̂, 1], F (p) is implicitly determined by π(k̄, p) = π ⇔











It is clear that F (p) is strictly increasing on this interval. Moreover, F (p) is continuous at p̂,
F (p0) = 0, and F (1) = 1.
Step 5: No Profitable Unilateral Deviations.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p0, k). The deviator’s market share is equal to that corre-
sponding to p = p0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not profitable.
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Consider a unilateral deviation to (p > p̂, k). This results in deviation profit
πd (p, k) = p
[


















n−1(1− λ)n−1−mλmγ(n−m− 1) <













m(1− λ)n−1−m(γ(n−m)− γ(n−m− 1))⇔






m [(1− λ)β]n−1−m ⇔
(1− F (p))n−1βn−1 < 1
n
[λ+ (1− λ)β]n−1 .
The last inequality follows from the fact that, as p > p̂,
(1− F (p))n−1βn−1 < (1− F (p̂))n−1βn−1 = (1− λ)n−1βn−1 .




Consider a unilateral deviation to
(
p < p̂, k̄
)



















< π (p, k) as∑n−1
m=0C
m







































n−1−m λm < 0⇔
− [(1− λ)β + λ− F (p)]n−1 + 1
n
[(1− λ)β + λ]n−1 < 0 .
The last inequality follows as for p < p̂,
− [(1− λ)β + λ− F (p)]n−1 < − [(1− λ)β]n−1.
But, using (15), − [(1− λ)β]n−1 + 1
n
[(1− λ)β + λ]n−1 = 0.
8.4 Discussion and Policy Implications
Proof of Corollary 3.
For β 6= 1, λ is defined in (15) and for β = 1 it is defined in (17). It is easy to see that when
evaluated at β = 1, expression (15) reduces to (17). Therefore, this proof uses (15) to cover both
31
cases.
Re-write (15) as λ(ñ) = 1− ñ
β − (β − 1)ñ where ñ = n





n−n/(n−1)(1− n+ n log n)
(n− 1)2 > 0 .












[β − (β − 1)ñ]2
< 0 .







































[β − (β − 1)ñ]2
> 0 .
Proof of Corollary 4.
I Suppose β ∈ (0, 1). limn→∞ exp[γ] = limn→∞
γmax {1− [1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n}
1− βn .
In this case, β < 1 and 1 + (1− λ)(β − 1) < 1 .
As limn→∞ (1− βn) = 0 and limn→∞ {1− [1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n} = 1, it follows that
limn→∞ exp[γ] = γmax .
I Suppose β > 1. It is convenient to write
limn→∞ exp[γ] = limn→∞
γmax {[β − λ(β − 1)]n − 1}
βn − 1 =
γmax
limn→∞ {[β − λ(β − 1)]n − 1}
limn→∞ (β
n − 1) .
limn→∞ {[β − λ(β − 1)]n − 1} = limn→∞ (βn − 1) =∞, as β > β−λ(β−1) = 1+(1−λ)(β−1) >
1 .
But the first inequality implies that the denominator converges faster. Then limn→∞ exp[γ] = 0.
I Suppose β = 1. By Corollary 3, limn→∞(1− λ) = 1. Then, limn→∞ γ(n)(1− λ) = γmax.
In all cases, the impact of γmax is straightforward.




1− n−1/(n−1)/(1 + n−1/(n−1))
]n − 1
(1/2)n − 1 for β = 1/2
n−1/(n−1) for β = 1[
2/(2− n−1/(n−1))
]n − 1
2n − 1 for β = 2
.
Proof of Corollary 5.






1 + (β − 1)(1− n−1/(n−1))
]n−1 − 1
}
βn − 1 =
γmax
[
β − (β − 1)n−1/(n−1)
] [ β
β − (β − 1)n−1/(n−1)
]n
− 1
βn − 1 =
γmax
[
β − (β − 1)n−1/(n−1)
]
[λ+ (1− λ)β]n − 1
βn − 1 .
As limn→∞
[
β − (β − 1)n−1/(n−1)
]
= 1, it follows that
limn→∞ πn = limn→∞
γmax [λ+ (1− λ)β]n − 1
βn − 1 .
But, the RHS is limn→∞ exp[γ]. Using Corollary 4, the results follow.
Using (16) and (19),
πn − exp[γ] = γmax
{
n(1− λ)n−1βn − 1
βn − 1 −





n(1− λ)n−1βn − [1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n
βn − 1 =
γmax
β[1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n−1 − [1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n
βn − 1 ,
where the last equality uses step3 in the proof of Proposition 3.
Then, πn − exp[γ] = γmax
[1 + (1− λ)(β − 1)]n−1(β − 1)(2− λ)
βn − 1 > 0.









Corollary 3, the convergence result follows.
Using (18) and (19),
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